Assessing the effects of unconventional monetary policy and low interest rates on pension fund risk incentives by Boubaker, Sabri et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Assessing the effects of unconventional
monetary policy and low interest rates
on pension fund risk incentives
Sabri Boubaker and Dimitrios Gounopoulos and Duc
Khuong Nguyen and Nikos Paltalidis
Champagne School of Management (Group ESC Troyes), Troyes,
France, Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle, United
Kingdom, IPAG Business School, Paris, France, Durham University
Business School, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom
May 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75594/
MPRA Paper No. 75594, posted UNSPECIFIED
1	
	
	
Assessing the effects of unconventional monetary policy and 
low interest rates on pension fund risk incentives 
 
Sabri Boubakera, Dimitrios Gounopoulosb, Duc Khuong Nguyenc,*, Nikos Paltalidisd 
 
a Champagne School of Management (Group ESC Troyes), Troyes, France 
b Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University, Newcastle, United Kingdom 
c IPAG Business School, Paris, France 
d Durham University Business School, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom 
 
Abstract 
This study quantifies the effects of persistently low interest rates near to the zero lower bound and 
the unconventional monetary policy on pension fund risk incentives in the United States. Using 
two structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models and a counterfactual scenario analysis, the re-
sults show that monetary policy shocks, as identified by changes in Treasury yields following 
changes in the central bank’s target interest rates, lead to a substantial increase in pension funds’ 
allocation to equity assets. Notably, the shift from bonds to equity securities is greater during the 
period where the US Federal Reserve conducted unconventional monetary policy measures. Ad-
ditional findings show a positive correlation between pension fund risk-taking, low interest rates 
and the decline in Treasury yields across both well-funded and underfunded public pension plans, 
which is thus consistent with a structural risk-shifting incentive.  
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1. Introduction 
“More than half of the largest local governments in the U.S. have liabilities from pen-
sion underfunding that exceed 100% of their revenues” (Moody’s Investors Service, Global 
Credit Research, 26 September 2013).  
The public finance community has become more concerned than ever before about under-
funded pension obligations that could cause a broad retirement crisis. The rise in life expec-
tancy, which significantly increases liabilities, and the immense challenges in the asset allo-
cation landscape render the financing of these liabilities more difficult than ever (Cocco et al., 
2005).1 Official estimates of US public pension fund shortfalls range from $700 billion to $1 
trillion, while the financial meltdown of 2008 exacerbated the underfunding problem.2 In the 
aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the average ratio of pension assets to liabilities (the 
funding ratio) plummeted from 95% as of fiscal year-end 2007 to 64% by fiscal year-end 
2009, and only recovered modestly to 74% for the 2013 fiscal year.3  
The severe funding gap has triggered increased interest among academics, practition-
ers, and policymakers in understanding the investment strategy and the risk-taking behavior 
of the public pension fund industry. While US public pension funds have evidently been in-
vesting an ever-increasing proportion of their assets in risky investments and equities, the 
empirical literature on determining long horizon optimal asset allocation has not settled this 
issue hitherto.4 For instance, Rauh (2009) finds that private pension plans have departed from 
traditional investments such as government bonds, and have heavily invested in risky securi-
ties such as equities and in alternative assets such as hedge funds, private equities and real es-
tate investment trusts in order to achieve higher return. Notably, the author also finds that 
																																								 																				
1 See also Cocco and Gomes (2012) for the role of longevity risk on saving and retirement decisions. 
2	This figure is obtained using the calculation and actuarial method of the US Census Bureau.  
3 Please see Appendix B for a detailed presentation of the most underfunded state pension plans. 
4 The US Public Fund Boards, which govern public pension funds, decide on the allocation of assets. Pension 
funds are largely unconstrained in the proportion of funds that can be invested in risky assets and in their as-
sumptions on the expected rate of return of the various asset classes. Therefore, they have significant latitude to 
choose their assets and their liability discount rate. 
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changes in the allocation of pension fund assets seem to be motivated by risk management ra-
ther than risk-shifting incentives. By contrast, Mohan and Zhang (2014) find that risk-shifting 
incentives dominate the US public pension funds asset allocation decisions. Some studies 
such as Campbell and Viceira (2001) and Cochrane (2014) show that investments in stocks 
can be less risky and more profitable for long horizon portfolios while other studies advocate 
a more conservative approach (e.g., Bader and Gold, 2007). According to Lucas and Zeldes 
(2009), the accounting rules for public pensions create an irregular incentive to invest in equi-
ties since projected liabilities are discounted and calculated on the basis of expectations for 
investment return instead of discounting them at a rate that reflects the risk of their liabilities. 
Similarly, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) document that pension funds exploit a loose regula-
tion to camouflage their deficits by investing in the stock market, which results in a higher 
discount rate for their liabilities.5 Altogether, these findings contrast those of Rauh (2009) 
and indicate that pension fund asset allocation decisions are driven by risk-shifting rather 
than risk management incentives.6 
Additionally, the dramatic changes in the US monetary policy framework can also be 
one of the factors that have serious impacts on pension fund risk-taking and asset allocation 
decisions. More precisely, the sharp reductions in interest rates to overcome the stock market 
crash of 2001 and the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy adopted to mitigate 
the financial crisis of 2008 might also incentivize changes in pension fund asset allocation 
decisions.7 The literature consistently provides evidence that the expansionary monetary poli-
																																								 																				
5 There are typically minimum funding requirements imposed by regulation in the US pension fund industry. In 
particular, the required minimum contributions are calculated on the basis of amortizing existing underfunding 
over a time period of 30 years, while the higher the assumed investment return, the lower the required contribu-
tion by pension fund members.	
6 Following Rauh (2009, p. 2689), a risk management incentive occurs when well-funded pension funds invest 
in riskier securities, while underfunded pension funds invest in less risky assets. 
7 The unconventional monetary policy measures (also called “quantitative easing”), conducted by the Federal 
Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), comprises a mix of instruments such as the zero lower 
bound target policy rate, repurchases of Treasury and agency bonds, and asset-backed securities. They have also 
been adopted by other central banks (e.g., Japan, the Eurozone, and the United Kingdom). There is also evi-
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cy successfully led to the reduction of long-term interest rates, as expected by the US Federal 
Reserve (see e.g., Gagnon et al., 2010; Wright, 2012), but also created financial constraints 
and provoked an increase in the risk-taking behavior for financial institutions. More concrete-
ly, Bernanke (2013, 2015) predicts that investors and portfolio managers dissatisfied with low 
returns may “reach for yield” by taking on more credit risk, duration risk, or leverage, while 
Chodorow-Reich (2014) find evidence of increased risk-taking for some private pension 
funds, starting in 2009 and dissipating in 2012. To date, little is known about how unconven-
tional monetary policy affects investment policy decisions of US public pension funds, de-
spite an extensive literature focusing on the economic and the financial sector effects (e.g., 
financial asset prices, interest rates, long-term yields, and the value of dollar) and the effec-
tiveness of this policy (Adam and Billi, 2007; D’Amico et al., 2012; Gali, 2014; Neely, 
2015). Instead, the pension funds literature emphasizes endogenous factors affecting asset al-
location decisions including, among others, the level of underfunding, fiscal and regulatory 
constraints, and effective risk management skills (Rauh, 2006; Aglietta et al., 2012; Blake et 
al., 2013; inter alia). 
This article contributes to the related literature by assessing the impact of unconven-
tional monetary policy and low interest rates on the risk incentives and the asset allocation 
decisions of US public pension funds. More precisely, our study goes one step further from 
the recent works of Rauh (2009), Lucas and Zeldes (2009) and Mohan and Zhang (2014), 
since it explicitly accounts for exogenous factors that affect pension fund risk-taking behav-
ior. We also extend these works by using a large sample and by offering new evidence on the 
discrimination between risk-shifting and risk management incentives in US public pension 
funds. The empirical literature on this issue is particularly thin and shows mixed results. For 
instance, Rauh (2009) finds no evidence that pension funds and especially financially dis-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
dence to suggest that these unconventional measures improve economic and financial conditions (e.g., 
Kapetanios et al., 2012; Joyce et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2012; Gambacorta et al., 2014).  
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tressed funds engage in risk-shifting behavior. The observed correlation between asset alloca-
tion and lagged investment returns implies that changes in the allocation of assets are 
prompted by an incentive for efficient risk management. On the contrary, Mohan and 
Zhang (2014) suggest that public funds undertake more risk when underfunded, which is con-
sistent with the risk transfer hypothesis.  
At the empirical level, we initially use a regression analysis to identify how asset allo-
cation changes over time and across monetary policy regimes (expansionary and contraction-
ary) with different interest rate levels. In order to quantify the role of monetary policy, as in 
Kapetanios et al. (2012), we identify monetary policy shocks by the changes in government 
bond yields following the changes in the US Federal Reserve policy interest rate. We employ 
a Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR) model, estimated over rolling windows, to capture 
the complex interrelationships between Treasury yields, interest rates, and asset and risk 
management decisions. This model allows for structural changes and takes into account un-
certainty about the probability distributions of the system’s variables when investigating the 
impulse response functions. To ensure the robustness of the findings, we also use a Markov-
switching structural VAR (MS-SVAR) model that relaxes the assumption of constant param-
eters over time and thus enables us to incorporate a more sophisticated treatment of potential 
structural changes across different regimes (Waggoner and Zha, 2003; Primiceri, 2005). The 
MS-SVAR underlying structural shocks are identified through restrictions on the impulse re-
sponses, as in Kapetanios et al. (2012). Notably, the use of different models that vary in their 
emphasis increases the robustness of our findings. Finally, we conduct a counterfactual anal-
ysis to show that Treasury yields would have been higher, ceteris paribus, in the absence of 
drastic changes in the monetary policy framework. This intuition is built on the link between 
government bond yields and interest rates proposed by Estrella (2005) and is similar in spirit 
to Kapetanios et al. (2012). 
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Our results indicate that interest rates at the zero lower bound and the launch of un-
conventional monetary policy prompted a gradual increase in equity assets and in pension 
fund risk-taking behavior. Additionally, risk-shifting incentives to avoid low-yield invest-
ments (such as Treasury bonds) in favor of riskier investments (such as equities and alterna-
tive assets) dominate pension fund asset allocation decisions. More precisely, the results over 
the whole sample period suggest that asset allocation is correlated with short-term lagged in-
vestment returns, and higher returns precede higher equity allocation. Given that from 2001 
till 2007 the equity market increased considerably, this provides evidence for procyclicality 
since an increase in the stock market triggers an increase in equity holdings. However, our 
sub-period analysis uncovers the absence of correlation between asset allocation and short-
term lagged investment returns. The slump of the stock market in 2008 was not followed by a 
reduction in equity assets, implying that there is a structural shift out of bond assets and that 
the risk management incentive is not the primary reason for the reduced allocation to bonds. 
Moreover, we find a positive correlation between the increase in equity allocation and 
monetary policy shocks associated with lower interest rates and lower Treasury yields, across 
well-funded and underfunded pension funds, which is consistent with a structural risk-
shifting incentive in favor of risky investments. A reduction in interest rates which is fol-
lowed by a decline of 5% in the 10-year Treasury yield over the period 1999–2014 is associ-
ated with an 18% decrease in the allocation of bond securities and a 17% increase in the allo-
cation to equity assets, across well-funded and underfunded plans. Finally, the results from 
the counterfactual analysis suggest that the risk-taking behavior of pension funds is affected 
by low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy. Particularly, in a higher interest 
rate environment without significant declines in Treasury yield, the investment return from 
bond securities would have been significantly larger, from 6.56% to 7.19% for a 100 basis 
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point rise in the 10-year Treasury yield and to 7.68% for a 200-basis-point appreciation in the 
yield.  
Consistent with Lucas and Zeldes (2009), we find that pension plans assume an unre-
alistically high expected rate of return, which they fail to reach on average. Concretely, the 
mean investment return across the group of pension funds is close to 8% and it is also used as 
the typical liability discount rate. A high expected return protects pensioners from having to 
increase their contributions. If risky assets perform well then the subsequent improvement in 
pension funding reduces the need for increased contributions. In many cases, the assumed 
higher level of interest rates would have helped many funds to achieve their planned return of 
8%, since the results indicate that in a higher interest rate environment the return increases 
significantly from 6.56 to 7.74% on average. Simultaneously, portfolio risk would have been 
substantially lower. Therefore, the low interest rate environment and the use of unconven-
tional monetary policy prompt a re-allocation of pension fund assets, leading to increased al-
locations to risky investments. However, it is worth noting that conclusions are drawn cau-
tiously as monetary policy is only one of the possible explanations for the risk-taking behav-
ior of pension plans and that other factors which might have an important role on pension 
fund asset allocation decisions are not examined in our study.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant lit-
erature. Section 3 describes the methodological approach. Section 4 depicts the dataset and 
analyses the results. Section 5 presents robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Pension fund asset allocation strategy 
The determination of an optimal asset allocation policy for public pension funds is an im-
portant but unsettled task. At a theoretical level, Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) describe a 
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pension liability as a contract between two parties with a put option exercisable in the event 
of bankruptcy and a strike price equal to the value of pension liabilities. The literature on the 
optimal portfolio choice for retirement savings starts with the argument that under specific 
assumptions (e.g., returns are normally distributed), the goal of shareholder maximization is 
achieved when pension funds invest in bonds (see, e.g., Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981; Bodie, 
1990; inter alia). These studies argue that long-term portfolios for retirement savings should 
be encouraged to hold more bonds than stocks. However, several recent studies observe that 
more than 50% of US pension fund assets are, on average, invested in stocks (Rauh, 2009; 
Mohan and Zang, 2014; inter alia). This shift in the allocation of assets can be explained by 
two main reasons. 
First, the portfolio-management landscape has changed radically. While equities have 
traditionally been classified as risky assets, there is now evidence suggesting that excess 
stock returns are actually less volatile over long holding periods and, thus, stocks are relative-
ly safe assets for long-term investors (see, Campbell and Viceira, 2002, Chapter 4). Moreo-
ver, Campbell and Viceira (2001) show that volatility shocks in the US stock market is not 
sufficiently persistent and negatively correlated with stock returns to justify a large negative 
intertemporal hedging portfolio demand for stocks with bond-related assets. Similarly, 
Cochrane (2014) documents that, in a dynamic intertemporal environment, investments in 
stocks can be less risky and more profitable for long horizon portfolios. In particular, the au-
thor proposes a dynamic trading strategy based on time-varying state variables as a different 
way of constructing long-horizon portfolios of stocks. Some other works on long-term portfo-
lio choice provide strong evidence that a long-term investor with a conservative attitude (i.e., 
risk averse) should hedge interest rate risk and respond to mean-reverting stock returns by in-
creasing the average allocation to equity securities (Campbell et al. 2003).  
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 A second reason for the shift in the asset allocation to equity securities is supported by 
the US regulatory environment. While the financial theory suggests that “the discount rate 
used to value future pension obligations should reflect the riskiness of the liabilities” (Brown 
and Wilcox, 2009), pension funds practically set their discount rates based on the characteris-
tics of the assets held in their portfolios, rather than the characteristics of the pension liabili-
ties. As a result, Lucas and Zeldes (2009) show that underfunded pension funds prefer to in-
vest heavily in higher yielding, but riskier assets, such as equities because they expect a high-
er average return to reduce underfunding over time. More precisely, the accounting rules for 
public pension funds set by the Government Accounting Standard Board create an irregular 
incentive to invest in equities since projected liabilities are discounted at the expected return 
on assets rather than at a rate that reflects the risk of liabilities.8 Hence, investing in stocks 
leads to a higher allowed discount rate for the liabilities, and this, in turn, allows pension 
funds to present lower degrees of underfunding and to camouflage their shortfalls as well as 
helps to postpone any increase for pension contribution to the future generations. 
2.2 Risk shifting versus risk management incentive 
As described above, recent developments in the empirical asset allocation literature and the 
accounting rules set for pension funds provide two arguments for the practice of investing in 
equity securities in long horizon portfolios. This investing approach is also largely in parallel 
with private sector practices. Blake et al. (2013) document that over the last two decades 
there is a shift from centralized to decentralized pension fund management, since funds re-
place managers with “better-performing” specialists. However, in most cases, pension plans 
are severely underfunded and their investments underperform. Munnell et al. (2008) report 
that the increased exposure to equity securities, from an average of about 40% in the early 
1990s to about 70% in 2000s, and the slump of stock markets in 2008 led to a loss of about 
																																								 																				
8The Government Accounting Standard Board is an independent organization that establishes standards of ac-
counting for public (state and local) pension funds. 
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US $1 trillion. In a similar vein, Franzoni and Marin (2006) argue that the combination of a 
deep stock market downturn and the fall in interest rates from 2000 to 2002 led to a $400billion 
loss on the funding status of US pension plans. Bader and Gold (2007) propose a more con-
servative approach by investing in bonds in order to reduce the volatility of funding levels 
and the likelihood of severe shortfalls during financial slumps. In a related study, Brown and 
Wilcox (2009) suggest that pension funds should use risk-free real interest rates to discount 
their pension promises and direct an increased proportion of investment to bond-related secu-
rities. Ebrahim et al. (2014) argue that the asset allocation puzzle is purely a partial equilibri-
um phenomenon feasible only in the absence of capital constraints. Hence, the risk-aversion 
attitude (such as investments in bond yields) allows for wealth smoothing. Therefore, in spite 
of the new developments analyzed in the previous studies, the ongoing literature clearly does 
not reach a consensus on the management practices of pension fund portfolios.9 
Rauh (2009) raises an additional critical issue regarding whether the shift in the risk-
taking behavior of pension funds is dominated by risk management or by risk-shifting incen-
tives. In particular, a risk management incentive suggests that well-funded pension funds 
could invest in riskier securities (such as equities) while underfunded pension funds would, 
on the contrary, invest in less risky assets (such as bonds). The author finds that the risk-
taking behavior of US pension plans is consistent with a risk management incentive. The 
findings of Rauh (2009) are lately contradicted by Mohan and Zang (2014), who test the risk 
management hypothesis and document that public pension funds undertake more risk when 
they are underfunded, indicating that the risk-shifting incentive dominates the risk-taking be-
havior of US pension plans.  
Overall, our literature review shows that the question of optimal portfolio choice for 
pension funds is still open to debate, while there is evidence to support the increase of the al-
																																								 																				
9 For an in-depth analysis and observation on this issue, see also Benzoni et al. (2007).  
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location to equity securities. Moreover, the literature remains inconclusive on whether this 
shift in the pension fund risk-taking behavior is due to risk management or risk-shifting in-
centives given the underfunding problem faced by many state pension plans. This lack of 
consensus motivates our empirical investigation on these issues, particularly in the context of 
the US expansionary monetary policy and low interest rate environment, which renders the 
path to performance of pension funds more challenging.   
 
3. Methodological framework 
As stated earlier, our study examines whether the new monetary policy framework is one of 
the factors that affects risk incentives and asset allocation decisions of US public pension 
funds. More precisely, we investigate whether low interest rates and unconventional mone-
tary policy create an incentive for pension funds to invest their assets in risky securities. Be-
sides the low interest rate environment since the early 2000s, unconventional monetary policy 
can also provide an additional incentive to investors to search for high yields by taking on 
more credit risk, duration risk, or leverage, as noted by Bernanke (2013). We also examine 
whether the new monetary policy era, marked by low interest rates and unconventional policy 
measures, encourages a risk management or a risk-shifting incentive for pension fund asset 
allocations. 
To assess these issues, we split our sample into four periods: i) Period 1 (1998–2000) 
when interest rates were between 4%–7% and the 10-year US Treasury yield was about 7% 
and, hence, investments in safe assets were attractive; ii) period 2 (2001–2005) when stock 
markets collapsed and interest rates reached historical low levels to promote a gradual eco-
nomic recovery; iii) period 3 (2006–2007) is characterized by improvements in economic 
conditions and significant credit expansion, which caused a moderate increase in interest 
rates; and finally iv) period 4 (2008–2013) corresponds to the reduction of the interest rate 
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near the zero lower bound, while also the US Federal Reserve announced a large program of 
asset purchases and other unconventional monetary measures. In order to quantify the role of 
different monetary policy regimes on pension fund risk-taking behavior, we use two structur-
al VAR models (BVAR and MS-SVAR) and follow Kapetanios et al. (2012) to define mone-
tary policy shocks as changes in bond yields following the changes in interest rates. This def-
inition is supported by the link between Treasury bond yields and interest rates (Estrella, 
2005). In addition, we examine several counterfactual scenarios in which monetary policy 
shocks are less persistent (i.e., interest rates decline modestly and therefore Treasury yields 
are higher) to investigate the effects on portfolio risk (i.e., beta) and how the allocation of as-
sets to risky investments could be affected. 
3.1 The BVAR model 
Vector autoregressive models, as introduced in the pioneering works of Sims (1972, 1980) 
represent a standard benchmark for the analysis of dynamic monetary policy experiments. 
Our study builds on two macroeconometric models to analyze the effects of monetary policy 
shocks on the risk-taking behavior of pension funds. We also conduct a counterfactual analy-
sis with respect to monetary policy shocks. More precisely, we simultaneously use a Bayesi-
an VAR model estimated over rolling windows where parameters are treated as random and a 
reduced-form MS-SVAR model, in which parameters are allowed to change over time. While 
the former enables us to reduce parameter uncertainty and improve forecast accuracy, the lat-
ter offers the possibility to capture the potential of regime changes.   
Lenza et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) provide a basic framework for captur-
ing the effects of monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic variables. Motivated by these 
studies, we define the monetary policy shock and then build a similar BVAR-based model:   !" = $%" + $'"           (1) 
13	
	
where !" is the monetary policy shock (i.e. a change in interest rates that leads to a larger or 
smaller change in bond yields), $%" represents the change (d) in interest rates (i), and $'" is 
the change (d) in Treasury bond yields (b). (" = )* + )+(",+ + ⋯+ ).(",. + /"        (2) 
where (" represents a vector of six variables (the monetary policy shock, the pension funds 
allocation to equities, its allocation to cash and bonds, its allocation to other assets, pension 
fund portfolio beta and its return on investments), )* is a vector of constants, )+ to ). are pa-
rameter matrices, and /" is the vector white-noise error term.  
We use a univariate AR(1) process with high persistence as our prior for each of the 
variables in the BVAR model.10 Hence, the expected value of the matrix )+  is 0()+) =0.99×7. We assume that )+ is normal conditionally on Σ, with first and second moments giv-
en by 0 )+(89) = 0.990 8:	8<98:	8=9 , ?@A )+89 = BC8D ⁄ C9D      (3) 
where )* contains a diffuse normal prior, )+(89) represents the element in position (i,j) in the 
matrix )+, and the covariances among the coefficients in )+ are zero. Also, the prior scale 
and the matrix of disturbances have  an inverted Wishart prior as explained in Appendix C so 
that F~%H(I*, J*), where I* and J*	are the prior scale and shape parameters, and with the 
expectation of Σ equal to a fixed diagonal residual variance 0 F = $%@K(C+D, … , CMD). Our 
BVAR model is similar to Bańbura et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) since it is esti-
mated using rolling windows to account for structural changes in monetary policy. Conse-
																																								 																				
10 We use a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test to obtain the most suitable number of lags. In particular, we let R(a)=0 to represent a 
set of restrictions and (N, FO) the likelihood function. Then the PQ = 2[TU NVW, FOVW) − TU NYO, FOYO)],  becomes (Q(NVW)[ [\[]^_ (FOYO ⊗ (aa),+)( [\[]^_)],+(Q NVW ) and we maximize the likelihood function with respect to α subject 
to R(α)=0. We test a VAR (b − 1) against VAR (b) and then a VAR (b − 2) against VAR (b − 1) to obtain the correct 
number of lags. In order to compare the results obtained by LR with other testing procedures we calculate: d(TU FOYO −TU FOVW ) eD(I)→g , where a" = h",+i , … , h",ji )i, and ai = a*, … , ak,+), is a (4×4) matrix (i.e. mq*T) and I = 2, which repre-
sents the number of restrictions. 
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quently, the shrinkage parameter φ determines the tightness of the prior which indicates the 
extent to which the data affects the estimates. 
3.2 The MS-SVAR model 
Our sample identifies four regimes: i) relatively high interest rates (and thus Treasury yields) 
between 1998 and 2000 (regime 1); ii) the stock market crash of 2001 (regime 2), which led 
to a dramatic decline in interest rates and in Treasury yields; iii) the 2007 to 2008 period, in 
which the federal funds target rate increased modestly and Treasury yields followed with a 
modest increase (regime 3); and iv) the period from mid-2008 until the end of our sample pe-
riod in 2013 (regime 4), in which the Federal Reserve decreased interest rates near to the zero 
lower bound (and Treasury yields collapsed) and adopted unconventional monetary measures 
(i.e., quantitative easing) to promote financial stability and economic development in the US. 
This pattern of frequent changes in the US monetary policy over recent years led us to con-
sider a regime switching structural VAR model with the following form: (" = l + m n (",+ + o"                     (4) 
where  (" is a vector of endogenous variables, c is a vector of intercepts, m n  is a matrix of 
autoregressive coefficients of the lagged value of (" and o" is a vector of residuals. The re-
duced-form error terms are related to the uncorrelated structural errors p" as follows: p" = q,+o"                       (5) 
The vector of endogenous variables ((") includes the following six variables in the 
VAR system: (" = [rs0n", rstn", 	rsdn", rsnt", 	rsQ", !"]                 (6) 
where rs0n"  represents the pension fund’s allocation to equities, rs0t"		 its allocation to 
cash and bonds, rsdn"		its allocation to other assets, rsnt" its asset beta, and rsQ"		its re-
turn on investments, and !" the monetary policy shock. 
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We modify the regime-switching structural VAR model in Equation (4) to allow for 
changes in the policymaker’s reaction (i.e., regime changes) and to study how pension funds 
are affected. Therefore, we propose an MS-SVAR model with non-recurrent states where 
transitions are allowed in a sequential manner. Hence, to move from regime 1 to regime 4, 
the process has to consider regime 2 and regime 3. Similarly, transitions to past regimes are 
not allowed. In particular: (" = lu + t9,vw9<+ (",9 + n*,vp"                    (7) 
Following Jin et al. (2006) and Mohan and Zhang (2014), we measure the pension as-
set beta as the weighted average of individual asset betas, i.e., r/Ux%yU	nxx/z	t/z@ =	 H8×{8W8<+ , where H8 is the weight of each asset class with H8 = 1W8<+ , and {8 is the esti-
mated beta of each asset class. We extend the SVAR model in Equation (4) to the case of an 
MS-SVAR with non-recurrent states to account for the regime-dependent reaction of pension 
funds to changes in monetary policies.11  
As in Chib’s (1998) study, the break dates of the regime changes in the model are un-
known and they are modeled through the latent state variable J, which is assumed to follow 
an M-state Markov chain process (where M refers to the dates of the regimes) with restricted 
transition probabilities, such that: |89 = | J" = } J",+ = % 	~%zℎ|89 > 0	%Å	% = }|89 > 0	%Å	} = % + 1|ÇÇ = 1|89 = 0				yzℎ/A~%x/           (8) 
Given the number of policy regime changes as described above, M is equal to 4 and 
the transition matrix is defined as: 
																																								 																				
11	Note that transitions between regimes are allowed in a sequential manner, and thus to move from regime 1 to 
regime 4, the process must visit regime 2 and regime 3. Transitions to past regimes are also not allowed and, in 
a similar way to the BVAR model and Equation (5), the vector (" contains annual data on pension funds, and t9,v and n*,v are regime-dependent autoregressive coefficients and structural shock loading matrices respective-
ly. 	
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r = |++ 0 			01 − |++ |DD 			00 1 − |DD 						|ÉÉ 			0			0							0					0 			0												1 − |ÉÉ 1  
Alternative modeling techniques provide different relative weights to the sample and 
prior information. Specifically, unrestricted VARs use information very sparsely in choosing 
the variables, in selecting the correct lag length of the model, and in imposing identification 
restrictions. As a result, unrestricted VAR models may lead to poor forecasting due to overfit-
ting the dataset (see, Koop, 2013). Structural and Bayesian methods provide a reliable solu-
tion for these problems as identified by De Mol et al. (2008) and George et al. (2008). By us-
ing Bayesian inference, we allow informative priors so that prior knowledge and results can 
be used to inform the current model. We also avoid problems with model identification by 
manipulating prior distributions. Therefore, this is the most suitable technique to employ for 
statistical regions of flat density. Moreover, an important assumption in Bayesian inference is 
that the data are fixed and the parameters are random. Hence, with restricted structural re-
gimes, we do not depart from reality. An additional advantage of the use of structural regimes 
and Bayesian inference is that these models include uncertainty in the probability model, 
yielding more realistic suggestions. Also, our structural models employ prior distributions 
and hence, more information is used along with 95% probability intervals for the posterior 
distributions.  
3.3 Counterfactual scenario 
To produce counterfactual forecasts, we base our analysis on the empirical work of Kapetani-
os et al. (2012) and assume that under a different monetary policy framework, interest rates 
would have been higher and therefore, the 10-year US Treasury yield would have been 100, 
120, or 200 basis points higher, for the whole sample period, ceteris paribus. In practice, we 
implement this impact on yields by changing the 10-year US Treasury yield spread to identify 
the effect of the simulations on the risk and asset allocation behavior of pension plans. There-
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fore, the effects of monetary policy are captured solely through lower government bond 
yields. We simulate two scenarios: (i) Monetary policy interventions lower interest rates and 
this in turn causes a downward shift in Treasury yields (i.e. monetary policy shocks); and (ii) 
in contrast to scenario (i) monetary policy does not change over time, monetary policy shocks 
are not identified, interest rates are higher and hence Treasury yields are higher. Notably, 
scenario (i) mimics the real monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve while capturing 
the effect of unconventional policies and low interest rates on pension fund asset allocation 
decisions. Accordingly, scenario (ii) assumes that interest rates and Treasury yields would 
have been higher and thus we adjust government bond spreads and the overnight repo rate. 
To identify the impact of monetary policy shocks, we compare the effect of the two scenarios 
on pension fund performance. 
In a similar vein, Wright (2012) uses a structural VAR model to provide ample evi-
dence that long-term interest rates and Treasury yields lowered significantly since the federal 
funds rate has been stuck at the zero lower bound. Using a similar model, Christensen and 
Rudebusch (2012) find that government bond yields declined, following announcements by 
the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England to buy long-term debt. Also, Weale and 
Wieladek (2016) use a Bayesian VAR model and document that the announcement of 1% of 
GDP of large-scale purchases of government bonds led to a rise of 0.58% and 0.25% in real 
GDP for the US and the UK, respectively. The counterfactual approach employed in this pa-
per is similar in spirit to Kapetanios et al. (2012) and goes one step further from the existing 
literature because it does not simply quantify the effects of the policy on pension funds, but it 
also examines a “what if” scenario, hypothesizing that interest rates and Treasury yields 
would have been higher in a different monetary policy framework.  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Data analysis and descriptive statistics 
We collect detailed information about the characteristics, pension plans, and asset allocations 
for 151 US pension funds from January 1998 to December 2013 from the Public Plans Data-
base (PPD) obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. The full 
sample includes 2,416 observations and consists of the historical yearly asset allocation in 
various asset classes for each pension fund and the yearly return by asset class from 1998 to 
2013, the latest year for which all data are available. Moreover, we collect, from Bloomberg 
database, yearly data for the 10-year US Treasury yield and the federal funds target rate (up-
per bound).12 Our sample includes at least one pension fund from each state, while also it 
contains the largest plans based on their assets. More precisely, Table 1 shows that there are 
224 state pension plans, with 151 included in our sample. In addition, there are 3,761 local 
pension plans.13 The total number of assets for all the state and local plans is about $3,2 bil-
lion, while our sample contains information for about $3,0 billion of assets, which is approx-
imately 92% of the total assets invested in the US public pension fund industry. Figure 1 
shows the dynamics of the federal funds target rate and the 10-year US Treasury yield. 
Throughout the 1998–2013 period the Treasury yield continuously declined from 6.82% in 
2000 to 1.49%. Similarly, the federal funds rate decreased from 6.5% in 2000 to 0.25% in 
2013. 
“Please insert Table 1 about here” 
“Please insert Figure 1 about here” 
Table 2 depicts the summary statistics with information on asset allocation for all 
pension funds during the entire sample period. More precisely, Panel A presents the assump-
tion for annual investment return on a yearly basis as reported by the pension funds. It con-
																																								 																				
12	Please see Appendix A for detailed information on the pension funds used in the analysis.	
13 Analytical data for the surplus or deficit and for the allocation of assets is available only for the 151 pension 
plans included in our sample, due to restrictions on data availability.	
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tains the 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year realized investment returns, and the funding gap ratio, which 
represents assets divided by actual liabilities. Any value which is lower than 1.0 implies that 
assets fall short of liabilities and thus the pension fund is underfunded, while a value higher 
than 1.0 indicates that assets exceed liabilities, and thus the pension fund is overfunded. Pan-
el B provides the asset allocation for the pension funds and the estimated betas (i.e., the sys-
tematic risk) for the overall period for each investment. 
Panel A shows that pension funds assume a high expected rate of return, but, on aver-
age, fail to reach that expectation. Hence, our descriptive summary statistics show that funds 
were, on average, underfunded during the sample period. Specifically, the mean investment 
return assumption (henceforth, the performance benchmark) is 7.86%, while the standard de-
viation for the assumed rate of return is 0.42%, indicating a very small variation in the return 
assumption within and across pension funds. This means that, if interest rates are below 5%, 
all investments allocated to government bonds and cash will underperform on an annual ba-
sis. The realized return for pension funds is much lower than the assumed rate of return. We 
provide the results for the average 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year returns and observe that pension 
funds underperform their expectations in each case. Indeed, the average returns are 5.58%, 
5.22%, 5.36%, and 6.87%, respectively. While pension funds in some years achieved returns 
that were higher than their assumed returns, they usually failed to meet their target over long-
er investment periods. 
It is worth noting that, over the 16-year period, the funds suffered several disastrous 
returns compared to the 8% benchmark. For instance, the low level of interest rates drove 
their returns much lower than the performance benchmark, while stock market crashes, which 
occurred in 2001 and in the financial meltdown of 2007–2008, further depressed their in-
vestments in equities. Therefore, our statistics suggest that public pension funds are assuming 
unrealistic investment returns, which leads to underfunding with annual contributions being 
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based on the assumption of an 8% annual return on investment. Again, the majority of pen-
sion funds are underfunded. The mean actuarial funding ratio for 1998–2013 is 82.4% with 
half of the observations lying in the range of 70.0%–90.0%. The minimum (19.6%) and the 
maximum (197.3%) ratios suggest a high variability of pension funding status. Furthermore, 
the average actuarial funding ratio declines from 98.9% in 1998 to 70.61% in 2013, suggest-
ing that underfunding worsens over the years, which is consistent with the failure to reach the 
benchmark return. 
“Please insert Table 2 about here” 
Table 3 compares asset allocation and portfolio beta by period. We observe that in-
vestments in equities and alternative assets increase meaningfully over the years. In particu-
lar, the average allocation to equities is 42.5% in period 1, and rises to 45.9% in period 2, 
50.0% in period 3, and 59.6% in period 4. This increased allocation to risky assets implies an 
increase in risk-taking behavior by public pension funds.  Accordingly, allocation to govern-
ment bonds declines from 39.1% in period 1 to 22.9% in period 4. Pension funds allocating a 
high percentage to equities are apparently most affected by severe market downturns. More 
importantly, we observe that the funding gap ratio increases over the years at the same level 
as the proportion of equity investments increases, leading to an increased number of under-
funded pension funds from period 1 to period 4. This is more evident in late 2008 and early 
2009, when pension funds with large allocations in stocks were more adversely affected. Eq-
uity allocation peaked in period 4 (2008–2013) when the Federal Reserve launched uncon-
ventional monetary measures and lowered its policy rates close to the zero lower bound, con-
firming that these policies affect pension funds and cause an incentive for riskier investments. 
Figure 2 also presents in detail changes in the allocation of assets from 1998 to 2013. 
“Please insert Figure 2 about here” 
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Similarly, portfolio beta follows an upward trend, but increases less than the equity al-
location due to the increased investments in alternative assets. The allocation to short-term 
cash also declines over these time periods, since lower interest rates offer an unattractive al-
ternative to pension funds, which expect a high annual return. Although the average alterna-
tive allocation over the entire period is 1.84%, it increases significantly over the period and 
ranges from 1.83% (period 1) to 6.3% (period 4). In summary, compared to the mean values 
for the entire period, bond and cash allocations are lower, while allocations in equities, alter-
native assets, and real estate assets are higher. Pension funds’ portfolio beta, as of 2013, is 
higher than the sample period average, due to the increase in equity assets and the drop in 
bond assets.  
Moreover, Panel A of Table 3 shows that during period 1 (1998–2000) pension funds, 
on average, invested more in government bonds compared to all other periods. As a result, 
government bonds represented a higher annual required contribution in pension fund invest-
ments. However, the lowering of policy rates close to zero and the associated decrease in the 
level of interest rates triggered a shift in asset allocations, from government bonds to equities 
and alternative investments. This is evident from the figures for period 2 in Panel B (2001–
2005), period 3 in Panel C (2006–2007) and period 4 in Panel D (2008–2013). Note that av-
erage funding ratios declined over the years, and this is related with low interest rates and the 
unconventional monetary policy. However, conclusions are drawn cautiously as other factors 
which might have an important role on pension fund asset allocation decisions are not exam-
ined in this study, and therefore, monetary policy is one of the factors affecting the risk taking 
behavior of pension plans.   
“Please insert Table 3 about here” 
 Panel A of Table 4 presents the top 15 pension funds by liabilities. The funding cov-
erage ratio ranges from 40% to 99%. The 5-year investment return is lower than the return 
22	
	
assumption of 8% for all pension funds and ranges from 1.7% to 6.8%, confirming the funds’ 
underperformance. However, while the 10-year return presents an improved picture, only two 
funds achieved a rate of return exceeding the return assumption of 8%. Notably, the majority 
of pension funds allocate more than 50% of their investments to equities and less than 25% to 
bonds. Panel B depicts the funds with the higher coverage ratio. It shows that the 5- and 10-
year returns are substantially higher when compared with the fund performance in Panel A. It 
is also evident that these funds allocate a much lower proportion of their assets to equities 
(32% on average) and a higher proportion to bonds (27%), suggesting that investing in equi-
ties does not imply better long-term performance. 
“Please insert Table 4 about here” 
4.2 Risk determinants of asset allocation 
To shed light on the effects of low interest rates and the unconventional monetary policy on 
pension funds, we examine the relationship between monetary policy shocks, defined as 
changes in interest rates which lead to larger or smaller changes in Treasury bond yields, 
with: i) the return on pension assets during the fiscal year; and ii) the portfolio’s risk (beta). 
Table 5 shows the regression results using pension fund asset allocation as the dependent var-
iable, during the four different time periods. Specifically, a 10% increase in the investment 
return reduces the percentage of assets allocated to Treasury bonds and to short-term cash by 
2.06% during period 1, and systematic risk increases by 0.42% as a result of the reduction of 
assets allocated to safe investments. By contrast, a 10% increase in the investment return in-
creases the percentage of assets allocated to equities by 4.81%. This in turn increases the sys-
tematic risk of the portfolio by 0.68%. 
We also find that a similar correlation exists during period 2, where a 10% increase in 
the investment return prompts a decrease in assets allocated to safe securities by 3.03%, while 
the percentage of assets invested in equity increases significantly by 6.94%. This relation im-
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plies that asset allocation is correlated with short-term lagged investment returns, with higher 
returns preceding higher equity and lower bond allocation. Interestingly, for pension funds 
with weak funding ratios (Panel B), the correlation between asset allocation and short-term 
lagged returns is meaningfully smaller, implying a risk-shifting behavior. Notably, in periods 
3 and 4, there is an increase in the proportion of alternative assets. The effect of lagged re-
turns is statistically significant at the 5% level. As a result, the allocation of assets is not cor-
related with short-term lagged investment returns, since higher returns precede lower equity 
and bond allocation. 
Notably, for all four periods, the allocation of assets is correlated with monetary poli-
cy shocks - changes in interest rates which lead to larger or smaller changes in bond yields -
since a 1% decline in bond yields leads to higher equity and lower bond allocation, as it is ev-
ident from Panels A and B of Table 5. During period 4, when the Federal Reserve announced 
a large program of asset purchases and at the same time lowered policy rates close to the zero 
lower bound, the effects are greater in magnitude. Specifically, the percentage of assets in-
vested in bonds for a 1% decline in Treasury yields is associated with a 10.52% decrease in 
the percentage of assets allocated to bond securities. The effect of changes in Treasury yields 
is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
“Please insert Table 5 about here" 
Overall, our results are consistent with the patterns shown in Figures 1–2, where a re-
duction in interest rates that was followed by a 5% decline in the 10-year Treasury yield over 
the period is associated with an 18% decrease in the allocation to bond securities and a 17% 
increase in the allocation to equity assets. This is observed for well-funded and underfunded 
pension plans, indicating a structural risk-shifting behavior. Consequently, a lower interest 
rate environment and the use of unconventional monetary policy measures prompt pension 
funds to change their strategic asset allocation from safe to riskier investments.   
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4.3 Results from the BVAR model 
We estimate the BVAR model using one lag order and a rolling approach for the entire sam-
ple period. Similar to Kapetanios et al. (2012), we assume that the use of unconventional 
monetary policy tools, from 2008 until 2011, and the sharp drop in interest rates near to the 
zero lower bound may have depressed government bond yields by about 100 basis points. To 
assess the impact of monetary policy shocks on the asset allocation and the risk taking behav-
ior of pension funds, we compare actual returns with those of the counterfactual scenario (i.e., 
government bond yields would have been 100 basis points higher than actual yields in the ab-
sence of monetary policy shocks) and take the difference between the two as our estimate. 
Moreover, we increase the asset allocation to government bonds and decrease the allocation 
to equities to identify the return to pension fund investments. This procedure is also used in 
Lenza et al. (2010) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) when they examine the effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy on the macroeconomy, and in Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012) when they ad-
dress the effect of monetary policy shocks on financial markets. We also use two additional 
tests by simulating the effects of a 120-basis-point and a 200-basis-point increase in govern-
ment bond yields and short-term overnight rates for cash holdings, while allowing the size of 
adjustment on the yields to vary over the entire sample period. 
 Table 6 reports the estimated effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund in-
vestment return and asset allocation. The mean return results reveal that monetary policy 
shocks substantially decreased the return on bond investments, making bond assets unattrac-
tive. The largest impact occurred in period 4 (2008–2013), when the Federal Reserve 
launched a large program of asset purchases and at the same time reduced the official US 
bank rate to 0.25%. While stock markets underperform, plans do not reduce their equity hold-
ings, indicating that there is a structural risk-shifting incentive to riskier securities, such as 
equities and alternative investments, as a result of the policy rate cut-off to the zero lower 
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bound. This evidence suggests that the funding status of a given pension plan changes in ac-
cordance with developments in monetary policy. Under this scenario, pension funds tend to 
invest more in equities and less in safe assets, such as government bonds. 
 How persistent are monetary policy shocks? We answer this question by examining 
the sensitivity of pension fund returns under the assumption that government bond yields 
would have been higher if there were no major changes in the Federal Reserve’s policy over 
the sample period. The results, reported in Table 6, indicate that the portfolio return for the 
pension funds increases significantly from 6.56% to 7.19% for a 100-basis-point rise in yield, 
and to 7.68% for a 200-basis-point increase in yield. It is notable that, in many cases (i.e., in 
period 1 and in period 2) the assumed higher level of interest rates helps pension funds to 
achieve their planned return of 8%. Figure 3 evidences the difference in return under the three 
counterfactual scenarios where the percentage of pension fund assets allocated to equities 
could be lower since investments in safer assets would be more attractive. 
“Please insert Table 6 about here” 
“Please insert Figure 3 about here” 
 In the scenario with higher interest rates, we add the assumption that investments in 
government bonds would be more attractive for pension funds and that they would allocate 
their assets accordingly. For a more meaningful comparison, the allocation to government 
bonds is kept constant at the proportion allocated during period 1. Table 7 presents the effects 
of the monetary policy on pension fund returns under these assumptions. The results indicate 
that the portfolio return would have been higher by 122 basis points, increasing from 6.64% 
to 7.86%, while the portfolio beta (systematic risk) would be substantially lower. 
 “Please insert Table 7 about here” 
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4.4 Results from the MS-SVAR model 
We test for the number of regimes by prior knowledge and carry out robustness checks by us-
ing the marginal likelihood criterion as introduced by Chib (1998). Figure 4 illustrates the es-
timated regime pattern for pension asset allocation, while Table 8 identifies monetary policy 
shocks through the changes in the interest rates and the associated change in Treasury yields. 
In particular, Table 8 presents the effects during the four monetary policy regimes: i) during 
period 1 (1998–2000), when interest rates increase and reach their peak levels for the entire 
sample period; ii) during period 2 (2001–2005), when interest rates decrease; iii) during peri-
od 3 (2006–2007), when interest rates increase moderately; and iv) during period 4 (2008–
2013), when interest rates are set at the zero lower bound and unconventional monetary tools 
emerge. Similar to Kapetanios et al. (2012), the shocks are identified using a sign. A positive 
monetary policy shock that increases interest rates is expected to trigger an increase in the 
yield curve. On the other hand, a negative shock is expected to cause a compression in the 
yield curve.  
“Please insert Table 8 about here” 
“Please insert Figure 4 about here” 
Figure 5 shows the impulse response functions to Treasury bonds and equity alloca-
tion following a monetary policy shock. From the figure it is clear that the monetary policy 
regime affects substantially the allocation of assets to equities and bonds. Specifically, the re-
sponse from pension funds was to increase the proportion of equities and to decrease accord-
ingly the proportion of assets allocated to government bonds. This finding suggests that pen-
sion funds risk taking meaningfully increases with a decline in the level of interest rates and 
with the launch of unconventional tools.  
“Please insert Figure 5 about here” 
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Additionally, to capture the effects of monetary policy shocks, we follow the scenari-
os studied using the BVAR model, where we assume that government bond yields would 
have been 100, 120, or 200 basis points higher, if there had been no dramatic changes in 
monetary policy. Table 9 describes the effects on pension fund asset allocation and invest-
ment return from these simulations. For a 100-basis-point increase in Treasury yields, the 
maximum impact occurs in period 2 (2001–2005) and period 4 (2008–2013), since during 
these two periods the unconstrained policy rate declines. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 
6, the investment return increases significantly from 6.56% to 7.74% for a 200-basis-point 
rise in yield. Similar to the results of the BVAR model, in many cases, the assumed higher 
level of interest rates helps pension funds to achieve their planned return of 8% (in periods 1 
and 2). Moreover, the MS-SVAR model indicates that, if monetary policy shocks had been 
less persistent, the portfolio risk (i.e., beta) would be smaller and the allocation to bond secu-
rities meaningfully higher. 
“Please Insert Table 9 about here” 
“Please Insert Figure 6 about here” 
Similarly, we also assume that pension funds would allocate their assets according to 
a scenario in which investments in bond securities would be more attractive and that the allo-
cation to government bonds would stay constant at the proportion allocated during period 1. 
The results obtained under this scenario, reported in Table 10, reveal that the investment re-
turn would have been higher by 122 basis points, changing from 6.70% to 7.92%, while the 
portfolio beta would be substantially lower. 
“Please insert Table 10 about here” 
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5. Robustness check 
The main finding of our study is that low interest rates and the launch of unconventional 
monetary policy (i.e., quantitative easing) trigger a risk-shifting behavior for pension funds to 
invest in riskier securities, such as equity assets. The allocation of assets to government bonds 
decreased meaningfully as pension funds invested on assets with higher yield, to finance their 
liabilities. We test the sensitivity of our results by using different scenarios for the effect of 
changes in government bond yields on pension asset allocation, portfolio risk, and investment 
return. In this section, we adopt the Chib (1998) approach and use a particle Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation to test for the number of possible regimes, since less than 
four, or more than four, regime switches in principle can occur. We also allow the regime to 
grow exponentially with time t, creating robust dependence between the state variables. 
“Please insert Table 11 about here” 
More precisely, the posterior MCMC approach, with a limit of 5,000 observations is 
used to compute the marginal log-likelihood values with the conditional variance depending 
only on past shocks.14 A high value of the log-likelihood (i.e., a value closer to zero) indicates 
better fitting. Table 11 presents the results estimated by bridge sampling. The differences be-
tween bridge sampling and Chib’s method are very small. Similarly, the alteration between 
the marginal log-likelihood values increases substantially from regimes 1 to 4, but decreases 
in regime 5 for all the pairs considered, as is evident in Table 11. The increased value in re-
gime 5 implies that the four-regime model fits the data best. 
 
6. Conclusion 
US public pension funds suffer from severe funding shortfalls, triggered, at least partially, by 
the stock market downturns experienced during the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Pension 
																																								 																				
14 The marginal likelihood is computed in the Markov-switching models in a similar way to Hamilton and 
Susmel (1994). 
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plans have clearly been investing an ever-increasing proportion of their assets in risky in-
vestments. In an important departure from the existing literature, this study provides new evi-
dence on the effects of unconventional monetary policy and low interest rates on the US pub-
lic pension funds. Our empirical analysis is based on counterfactual scenarios, a BVAR mod-
el and a MS-SVAR model. The MS-SVAR model, in particular, allows us to analyze the 
complex relationships between Treasury yields, interest rates, and pension fund asset and risk 
management decisions, while relaxing the assumption of constant parameters over time to al-
low for capturing structural changes in pension fund asset allocation strategy. We find that 
monetary policy shocks, defined as changes in Treasury yields following changes in interest 
rates, are associated by an increase in equity and a decrease in bond assets.  
More precisely, a decrease in interest rates, which is followed by a decline of 5% in 
the 10-year Treasury yield over the study period, decreases the allocation to bond securities 
by 18% but increases the allocation to equity assets by 17%. The greater impact occurs dur-
ing the unconventional monetary policy period with the launch of quantitative easing and the 
zero lower bound policy. These results imply that a lower interest rate environment and the 
use of unconventional monetary policy measures prompted pension funds to change their 
strategic asset allocation from safe to riskier investments, and thus constitute an explanation 
for the risk-taking behavior of pension plans.   
Moreover, our counterfactual analysis shows consistent results on the reaction of pen-
sion fund investment return to monetary policy shocks, whatever the model used. For exam-
ple, the portfolio return in pension funds increases significantly from 6.56% to 7.19% for a 
100-basis-point rise and to 7.68% for a 200-basis-point increase in the Treasury yield using 
the BVAR approach. For the MS-SVAR model, the portfolio return increases from 6.56% to 
7.74% for a 200-basis-point increase in the yield. Notably, in many cases the assumed higher 
level of interest rates helps pension funds achieve their benchmark return of 8% (i.e., in peri-
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od 1 and in period 2). Finally, we document that the risk management incentive is not the 
primary reason for the reduced allocation to bond investments in pension funds. Well-funded 
and underfunded pension funds invest the largest proportion of their assets in equity securi-
ties, indicating that the risk-shifting incentive dominates the risk taking behavior of US public 
pension funds.  
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Appendix A: Data Analysis 
In the US, public sector pensions are offered by three sources: The federal, state and 
local levels of government. Pension plans are divided into two categories namely defined 
benefit and defined contribution pensions. The former has been more widely used over the 
last years by public agencies in the US. Each state administers at least one pension system 
and each system has at least one pension plan. A state government usually establishes multi-
ple pension plans within one pension system for employees with different job qualifications 
and tenure of service. In particular, our dataset contains: i) Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (PERS) plans –also called Employees’ Retirement System (ERS) plans– offered to all 
state police officers, as well as all other qualifying state government employees; ii) the 
Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS) plan, which is offered for employees of state-sponsored 
educational institutions; iii) the State Retirement System (SRS), which is offered to public 
servants, including teachers, municipal workers, and other government employees; iv) plans 
for public safety personnel (PSP); and v) plans for police officers and firefighters. The num-
ber of pension systems in each state ranges from one to six – California and Texas each have 
six pension systems.  
The major data source for the study is the Public Plans Database (PPD) obtained from 
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College15. The PPD data are collected from 
plans, annual reports, and actuarial valuations. The sample period includes fiscal years from 
1998 to 2013, and covers 151 pension systems from 50 states.  
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
15 More information is available from the Centre for Retirement Research at Boston College at: 
http://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database/ 
34	
	
Table A1. State pension funds used in the sample 
Plan Name Plan Name Plan Name 
Alabama ERS Alabama Teachers Alaska PERS 
Alaska Teachers Arizona Public Safety Personnel Arizona SRS 
Arkansas PERS Arkansas Teachers California PERF 
California Teachers City of Austin ERS Chicago Firefighters 
Colorado School Colorado State Colorado Municipal 
Connecticut Teachers Connecticut SERS Contra Tennessee County 
DC Teachers DC Police & Fire Delaware State Employees 
Denver Employees Denver Schools Florida RS 
Georgia County Schools Georgia ERS Georgia Teachers 
Georgia Municipal Hawaii ERS Idaho PERS 
Illinois Municipal Illinois SERS Illinois Teachers 
Indiana PERF Indiana Teachers Iowa PERS 
Kansas PERS Kentucky County Kentucky ERS 
Kentucky Teachers LA County ERS Louisiana SERS 
Louisiana Teachers Maine Local Maryland PERS 
Massachusetts State and Teachers Massachusetts SERS Massachusetts Teachers 
Massachusetts ERF Michigan Public Schools Michigan SERS 
Michigan Municipal Minnesota PERF Minnesota State Employees 
Minnesota Teachers Mississippi PERS Missouri DOT and Highway Patrol 
Missouri Local Missouri PEERS Missouri State Employees 
Missouri Teachers Montana PERS Montana Teachers 
Nebraska Schools Nevada Police Officer  
and Firefighter 
Nevada Regular Employees 
New Hampshire  
Retirement System 
New Jersey PERS New Jersey Police & Fire 
New Jersey Teachers New Jersey PERF New Mexico Teachers 
New Mexico PERF New York City ERS New York Sate Teachers 
North Carolina Local Government North Dakota PERS North Dakota Teachers 
North Carolina State & Local ERS North Carolina State & Local Police 
& Fire 
Ohio PERS 
Ohio Police & Fire Ohio School Employees Ohio Teachers 
Oklahoma PERS Oklahoma Teachers Oregon PERS 
Pennsylvania School Employees Pennsylvania State ERS Phoenix ERS 
Rhode Island ERS REPS Louisiana San Diego County 
San Francisco City & County South Carolina Police South Carolina RS 
South Dakota PERS St. Louis Indiana School Employees St. Paul Indiana Teachers 
Texas County & District Texas ERS Texas LECOS 
Texas Municipal TN Political Subdivisions TN State and Teachers 
University of North Carolina Utah Noncontributory Vermont State Employees 
Vermont Teachers Virginia Retirement System Washington LEOFF Plan 2 
Washington PERS 2/3 Washington School Employees Plan 
2/3 
Washington Teachers Plan 2/3 
West Virginia PERS West Utah Teachers Wisconsin Retirement System 
Wyoming Public Employees Massachusetts State Corrections Of-
ficers Retirement Plan {CORP} 
Connecticut Municipal Employees 
Retirement System {MERS} 
Iowa Municipal Fire and Police Re-
tirement System {MFPRSI} 
Louisiana Municipal Police Em-
ployees Retirement System 
{MPERS} 
Louisiana School Employees Re-
tirement System {LSERS} 
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Louisiana State Parochial Employ-
ees Retirement System {PERS} 
Minnesota Public Employees Re-
tirement Association 
{MPERA}[Police and Fire Retire-
ment Fund] 
Oklahoma Police Pension and Re-
tirement System {Police System} 
Utah Public Safety Montana County Employee's Re-
tirement Association {ACERA} 
Wyoming County Employees Re-
tirement Association {KCERA} 
North Carolina City Employees Re-
tirement System {LACERS} 
North Carolina Fire and Police Pen-
sion System {Pensions} 
Montana Water and Power Employ-
ees Retirement Plan {DWP} 
Massachusetts County Employees 
Retirement System {ERS} 
Massachusetts County Employees 
Retirement System {The System} 
Georgia City Employees Retirement 
System {SDCERS} 
Georgia Municipal Employees An-
nuity Benefit Fund {"The Plan"} 
Louisiana Police Annuity Benefit 
Fund {"The Fund"} 
Wyoming County Employees An-
nuity Benefit Fund {CEABF} 
Boston Retirement Board Massachusetts Fire Dept Article 1B 
Pension Fund 
Georgia Police Pension Fund Arti-
cle 2 
Georgia Municipal Pension Plan Louisiana Police and Fire Pension 
System 
Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement 
System 
Massachusetts City Employees Re-
tirement System {The System} 
Chicago Teachers South Carolina Municipal Retire-
ment System 
Missouri Fire Employees Retire-
ment System  
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Appendix B. Most underfunded pension funds in the post-credit crisis period 
 
Rank State 
Funding 
ratio 2013 
(%) 
Funding 
ratio 2012 
(%) 
Funding ra-
tio 2011 (%) 
Funding 
ratio 2010 
(%) 
Funding 
ratio 2009 
(%) 
Funding 
ratio 2008 
(%) 
Median funding 
ratio (2008-2013, 
%) 
1 Illinois 39.3 40.4 43.4 45.4 50.6 54.3 44.4 
2 Kentucky 44.2 46.8 50.5 54.3 58.2 63.8 52.4 
3 Connecticut 49.1 49.1 55.1 53.4 61.6 61.6 54.3 
4 Alaska 54.7 59.2 59.5 60.9 75.7 74.1 60.2 
5 Kansas 56.4 59.2 62.2 63.7 58.8 70.8 60.7 
6 New Hampshire 56.7 56.2 57.5 58.7 58.5 68.0 58.0 
7 Mississippi 57.6 57.9 62.1 64.0 67.3 72.8 63.1 
8 Louisiana 58.1 55.9 56.2 55.9 60.0 69.6 57.2 
9 Hawaii 60.0 59.2 59.4 61.4 64.6 68.8 60.7 
10 Massachusetts 60.8 65.3 71.4 68.7 63.8 80.5 67.0 
11 North Dakota 61.0 63.5 68.8 72.1 83.4 87.0 70.5 
12 Rhode Island 61.1 62.1 62.3 61.8 64.3 59.7 62.0 
13 Michigan 61.3 65.0 71.5 78.8 83.6 88.3 75.2 
14 Colorado 61.5 63.2 61.2 66.1 70.0 69.8 64.7 
15 West Virginia 63.2 64.2 58.0 56.0 63.7 67.6 63.5 
16 Pennsylvania 64.0 65.6 71.7 77.8 85.5 86.9 74.7 
17 New Jersey 64.5 67.5 68.1 66.0 71.3 76.0 67.8 
18 Indiana 64.8 61.0 64.7 66.5 72.3 69.8 65.7 
19 Maryland 65.3 64.2 64.5 63.9 64.9 77.7 64.7 
20 South Carolina 65.4 67.9 66.5 68.7 70.1 71.1 68.3 
21 Virginia 65.4 69.5 72.0 79.7 83.5 81.8 75.9 
22 Alabama 66.2 66.9 70.1 73.9 75.1 79.4 72.0 
23 Oklahoma 66.5 64.9 66.7 55.9 57.4 60.7 62.8 
24 New Mexico 66.7 63.1 67.0 72.4 76.2 82.8 69.7 
25 Vermont 69.2 70.2 72.5 74.6 72.8 87.8 72.7 
26 Nevada 69.3 71.0 70.1 70.5 72.4 76.2 70.8 
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27 Ohio 71.9 65.1 67.8 67.2 66.8 86.0 67.5 
28 Montana 73.3 63.9 66.3 70.0 74.3 83.4 71.7 
29 Arizona 74.1 74.5 73.2 77.0 79.9 80.8 75.7 
30 Arkansas 74.5 71.4 72.5 74.8 77.5 87.2 74.6 
31 Minnesota 74.7 75.0 78.4 79.8 77.1 81.4 77.7 
32 Utah 76.5 78.3 82.8 85.7 84.1 100.8 83.4 
33 Missouri 76.6 78.0 81.9 77.0 79.4 82.9 78.7 
34 California 76.9 77.4 78.4 80.7 86.6 87.6 79.5 
35 Wyoming 78.7 79.6 83.0 85.9 88.8 79.3 81.3 
36 Nebraska 79.2 78.2 81.9 83.8 87.9 92.0 82.8 
37 Maine 79.6 79.1 80.2 70.4 72.6 79.7 79.3 
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Appendix C. The Likelihood function 
 
Following Sims (1980), Equation (1) in 3.2 becomes: ! = #$ + &          (C1) 
and ' = () ⊗ # + + ,, ,~0, 01 ⊗ (2       (C2) 
where Y and E are (4×4) matrices and X is a (4×1) matrix, #4 = ['4678 , … , '46:8 , '48); y and e 
are (4×1) vectors, () is the identify matrix, and + = <,=($) is a (4×1) vector.   
Thus, the likelihood function of Equation (C2) is (+ , 01)∞|01 ⊗ (2|6A.Cexp	{−0.5(' − () ⊗ # +)8 0167 ⊗ (2 ' − () ⊗ # +)}(C3) 
where (' − () ⊗ # +)8 0167 ⊗ (2 ' − () ⊗ # + = (016A.C ⊗ (2)(' − () ⊗ # +)8(016A.C ⊗ (2)(' − () ⊗ # +) = (016A.C ⊗ (2 ' − (016A.C ⊗ #)+)]8(016A.C ⊗ (2)' − (016A.C ⊗ #)+)] 
and also (016A.C ⊗ (2)' − (016A.C ⊗ #)+)= (016A.C ⊗ (2)' − (016A.C ⊗ #)+MNO + (016A.C ⊗ #)(+MNO − +) 
where   +MNO = (0167 ⊗ #8#)67(0167 ⊗ #)8' 
Therefore, we have 	(' − () ⊗ # +)8 0167 ⊗ (2 ' − () ⊗ # + = (016A.C ⊗ (2 ' − (016A.C ⊗ #)+MNO)8 (016A.C ⊗ (2 ' − (016A.C ⊗ #)+MNO)  (C4) +(+MNO − +)8(0167 ⊗ #8#)	(+MNO − +)      (C5) 
We derive the likelihood function of a VAR (q=1) as the product of a Normal density 
for +, conditional on the OLS estimate (i.e. +MNO) and on 01, and a Wishart density for 0167, 
conditional on a +MNO from the decomposition of Equation (C4) and Equation (C5) as follows: 
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(+ , 01)∞|01 ⊗ (2|6A.Cexp	{−0.5(+MNO − +)8(0167 ⊗ #8#)	(+MNO − +) −0.5(016A.C ⊗ (2)' − (016A.C ⊗ #)+MNO)8[(016A.C ⊗ (2)' − (016A.C ⊗ #)+MNO)]} = |01|6A.CPexp	{−0.5(+MNO − +)8 0167 ⊗ #8# +MNO − + } ×|01|6A.C 26P exp	{−0.5QR[ 016A.C ⊗ (2 ' −(016A.C ⊗ #)+MNO)8[(016A.C ⊗ (2)' − (016A.C ⊗ #)+MNO)]} ∞ℕ(+|+MNO, 01, #, ')×T(0167|', #, +MNO, U − V −W − 1)    (C6) 
where QR is the trace of the scale matrix [(' − (() ⊗ #)+MNO)8(' − (() ⊗ #)+MNO)]67. The 
conditional posterior for +  will be normal and the conditional posterior of 0167  will be 
Wishart. 
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Figure 1. Nominal yields on 10-year Treasury bonds and the federal funds target rate 
Notes: The figure shows nominal yields from 1998 to 2013 on 10-year Treasury bonds for the U.S. and the federal funds target rate set by the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee. The data has been collected from Bloomberg database. 
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Figure 2. The average pension funds asset allocation 
Note: The figure presents the asset allocation of pension funds for the following time-periods: from 1998–2013 (overall sample period), from 1998–2000 (period 1), from 
2001–2006 (period 2), from 2007–2008 (period 3), and from 2009–2013 (period 4). The sample contains 151 pension funds from 50 states.  
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Figure 3. BVAR counterfactual analysis 
Note: The figure shows the persistence of monetary policy shocks on pension funds risk-taking behavior. The actual return refers to the achieved investment return in pension 
assets from 1998 to 2013. Three scenarios are simulated, where the Treasury yield is higher by 100 basis points, 120 basis points, and 200 basis points, respectively, to assess 
the portfolio return. 
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OVERALL PANEL: PROBABILITY OF REGIME 1 
 
 
SUB-PANELS: PROBABILITY OF REGIMES 1 -2 -3 -4 
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        SUB-PANEL C        SUB-PANEL D 
 
Figure 4. MS-SVAR switching regimes 
Note: The figure illustrates the four Markov switching regimes, estimated using the MS-SVAR model. The Overall Panel exhibits the whole sample period and shows the 
identification of Regime 1. There are also four Sub-Panels which focus mainly on the period when the Regime is identified. Sub-Panel A shows regime 1 (1998–2000) where 
interest rates increased. Sub-Panel B displays regime 2 (2001–2006) where interest rates declined. Sub-Panel C exhibits regime 3 (2007–2008) where interest rates increased 
moderately. Sub-Panel D reveals regime 4 (2009–2013) where interest rates declined near the Zero Lower Bound. 
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Figure 5. Generalized impulse response functions to monetary policy shocks 
 
 
 
Note: This figure depicts the generalized impulse response functions of the endogenous variables of the MS-
SVAR model during four different monetary policy environments (Regimes 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively). The 
four regimes represent the identification of the shocks (i.e. changes in the interest rates that lead to larger or 
smaller changes to bond yields). The figure summarizes responses by pension funds regarding the allocation of 
assets to government bonds and to equities following monetary policy shocks. The Y axis represents changes in 
the allocation and the X axis represents the time period. During Regime 1, the monetary policy shock causes a 
slight negative response to government bonds and a positive response (i.e. increase in the allocation) in equities. 
During Regime 2, when interest rates decline government bonds respond negatively (i.e. downward slope), 
while equities respond positively. During Regime 3, the monetary policy shock initially causes a negative re-
sponse to the allocation of government bonds (downward slope), but later the response of government bonds re-
covers to higher levels, indicating allocation to bond assets increased slightly, which might be due to the in-
crease in interest rates. On the contrary, the response of equities is initially positive, but later it becomes slightly 
negative. Finally, during Regime 4 (i.e. interest rates at historically low levels) the response of government 
bonds is overly negative, while allocation to equities increases substantially.    
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Figure 6. MS-SVAR counterfactual analysis 
Note: The figure shows the persistence of monetary policy shocks on pension fund risk-taking behavior. The ac-
tual return refers to the achieved investment return in pension assets from 1998 to 2013. Three scenarios are 
simulated, where the Treasury yield is higher by 100 basis points, 120 basis points, and 200 basis points, respec-
tively, to assess the portfolio return. 
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Table 1. Data analysis 
This table presents the total number of state and local pension funds in the US. The number of states that is in-
cluded in our sample is in parenthesis. Also, the table presents total assets for all the pension schemes (i.e. state 
and local) offered from each State, and assets that are included in our sample (i.e. assets in-sample). The total 
number of state pension plans is 224, while 151 are included in our sample. The total number of local pension 
plans is 3,761. Our sample contains the biggest pension plans by assets, and therefore it represents about 92% of 
the total assets of the public (state and local) pension fund industry. The source of this data is from the U.S. 
Cencus Bureau. 
 
State State Local Total Assets Assets in-sample 
1 Alabama 4 (2) 6  $      33,251,180   $      31,688,375  
2 Alaska 4 (2) 2  $      10,406,246   $         9,573,746  
3 Arizona 4 (4) 3  $      41,443,164   $      40,655,744  
4 Arkansas 6 (2) 27  $      22,219,051   $      19,019,508  
5 California 5 (5) 58  $    657,647,900   $    639,233,759  
6 Colorado 2 (2) 65  $      46,530,078   $      42,500,573  
7 Connecticut 6 (3) 55  $      32,522,521   $      29,562,972  
8 Delaware 1 (1) 7  $         8,642,790   $         8,020,509  
9 Florida 1 (1) 471  $    163,785,916   $    138,890,457  
10 Georgia 10 (8) 24  $      82,222,704   $      73,918,211  
11 Hawaii 1 (1) 0  $      12,051,078   $      12,051,078  
12 Idaho 2 (1) 2  $      12,272,952   $      11,413,845  
13 Illinois 6 (5) 650  $    135,110,275   $    119,302,373  
14 Indiana 8 (6) 61  $      28,263,756   $      25,550,435  
15 Iowa 4 (2) 5  $      27,525,334   $      25,075,579  
16 Kansas 1 (1) 7  $      15,918,274   $      14,660,730  
17 Kentucky 6 (3) 15  $      28,043,843   $      25,211,415  
18 Louisiana 14 (8) 21  $      39,936,873   $      34,026,216  
19 Maine 1 (1) 0  $      11,432,765   $      11,432,765  
20 Maryland 2 (1) 17  $      54,432,962   $      49,697,294  
21 Massachusetts 14 (9) 86  $      64,984,732   $      58,746,198  
22 Michigan 6 (5) 130  $      76,494,465   $      67,468,118  
23 Minnesota 8 (4) 137  $      53,136,559   $      44,634,710  
24 Mississippi 4 (2) 0  $      23,017,265   $      21,337,005  
25 Missouri 10 (5) 56  $      58,748,518   $      51,169,959  
26 Montana 9 (4) 0  $         9,060,965   $         7,819,613  
27 Nebraska 5 (3) 8  $      12,748,146   $      11,090,887  
28 Nevada 2 (2) 0  $      29,002,144   $      29,002,144  
29 New Hampshire 2 (1) 2  $         6,450,662   $         5,812,046  
30 New Jersey 7 (4) 3  $      74,449,190   $      66,706,474  
31 New Mexico 5 (2) 0  $      23,139,872   $      19,946,570  
32 New York 2 (2) 6  $    382,206,781   $    358,127,754  
33 North Carolina 6 (6) 2  $      79,986,718   $      77,747,090  
34 North Dakota 2 (2) 9  $         4,074,364   $         3,675,076  
35 Ohio 5 (4) 1  $    159,749,953   $    142,337,208  
36 Oklahoma 6 (3) 6  $      26,611,420   $      21,927,810  
37 Oregon 1 (1) 5  $      59,390,416   $      54,639,183  
38 Pennsylvania 3 (3)   1,577   $      95,888,331   $      80,450,310  
39 Rhode Island 1 (1) 12  $         8,511,634   $         7,583,866  
40 South Carolina 4 (3) 2  $      27,627,880   $      24,837,464  
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41 South Dakota 2 (1) 2  $         9,571,530   $         8,537,805  
42 Tennessee 1 (1) 14  $      45,050,770   $      42,708,130  
43 Texas 7 (7) 125  $    213,473,749   $    192,553,322  
44 Utah 6 (3) 1  $      22,991,422   $      20,048,520  
45 Vermont 3 (2) 2  $         3,613,701   $         2,901,802  
46 Virginia 1 (1) 17  $      70,627,037   $      65,895,026  
47 Washington 6 (6) 20  $      65,919,198   $      61,436,693  
48 West Virginia 1 (1) 40  $      12,330,864   $      11,147,101  
49 Wisconsin 1 (1) 2  $      89,813,290   $      87,388,331  
50 Wyoming 6 (3) 0  $         6,851,026   $         5,713,756  
  
224(151) 3,761  $3,279,182,264   $3,014,875,552  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the 151 US pension funds from 50 states, with 2,416 observations. 
Panel A provides the summary statistics for pension plan return assumption, investment returns and the funding ratio, 
from 1998 to 2013. Panel B provides the summary statistics for the allocation of assets for the whole time period.  
The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College and the Bloomberg database. 
Panel A: Pension funds characteristics. 
 
Mean (%) 
Standard 
deviation 
(%) Minimum (%)  Median (%) Maximum (%) 
Return Assumption     7.86      4.19     5.75      8.00       9.00  
1 Year Inv. Return     5.58      12.04  – 30.70      8.84       31.65  
3 Years Inv. Return     5.22      6.27  – 13.70      5.21       17.90  
5 Years Inv. Return     5.36      3.61  – 3.54      4.20       25.66  
10 Years Inv. Return     6.87      2.54  – 1.47     7.20       13.90  
Funding Gap Ratio     82.44     19.62      19.10      82.50     197.39  
      Panel B: Pension asset allocation, average for the overall sample period (1998-2013) 
 
 Mean (%) 
 Standard 
deviation 
(%)  Minimum (%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       53.87       12.27  0.00      56.10         75.40  
 Domestic Equities       36.21       12.42  0.00      38.50         71.57  
 International Equities       16.44       6.39  0.00      16.81        36.04  
 Bonds       27.32       9.70  0.00      26.30         100.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       25.98       11.31  0.00      25.00         100.00  
 International Bonds       2.44       2.41  0.00      0.30         9.90  
 Real Estate       6.07       4.15  0.00      5.96         28.40  
 Cash       2.44       2.99  0.00      0.17         22.50  
 Alternative Invest.       1.84       7.56  0.00      4.40         56.62  
 Pension Asset Beta       57.43       19.38  38.39      50.42         69.88  
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Table 3. Pension fund asset allocation 
This table depicts the detailed asset allocation and the portfolio beta for 151 pension funds from 50 US States, with 2,416 
observations. Panel A provides the allocation from 1998 to 2000. Panel B presents the allocation of assets from 2001 to 
2006. Panel C shows the allocation of assets from 2007 to 2008 and Panel D exhibits the allocation of assets from 2009 
to 2013. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Bos-
ton College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Panel A: Pension asset allocation, Period 1: 1998–2000 
 
 Mean (%)  
  St. deviation 
(%)  
 Minimum 
(%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       42.52       9.88  0.00      42.76         57.81  
 Domestic Equities       34.73       6.59  0.00      34.01         94.22  
 International Equities       7.79       3.82  0.00      4.28         19.35  
 Bonds       40.94       9.60  0.00      36.07         100.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       39.10       6.34  0.00      46.87         100.00  
 International Bonds       1.84       1.16  0.00      1.21         3.80  
 Real Estate       3.85       3.61  0.00      3.90         8.74  
 Cash       10.86       5.73  0.00      10.06         30.69  
 Alternative Invest.       1.83       2.04  0.00      1.62         8.77  
 Pension Asset Beta       48.46       10.53 0.00       44.93             56.25 
      Panel B: Pension asset allocation, period 2: 2001–2006 
 
 Mean (%) 
St. deviation 
(%) 
 Minimum 
(%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       45.98       11.73  0.00      49.22         60.02  
 Domestic Equities       38.06       8.21  0.00      38.86         91.66  
 International Equities       7.92       5.05  0.00      9.40         25.80  
 Bonds       37.58       10.08  0.00      39.79         98.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       36.23       6.47  0.00      46.35         100.00  
 International Bonds       1.35       1.55  0.00      1.60         5.00  
 Real Estate       5.50       5.74  0.00      8.62         12.08  
 Cash       9.03       5.31  0.00      10.11         24.64  
 Alternative Invest.       1.91       2.26  0.00      1.64         10.93  
 Pension Asset Beta       50.96       12.07 0.00      46.83        60.30 
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Panel C: Pension asset allocation, period 3: 2007–2008 
 
 Mean (%)  
  St. deviation 
(%)  
 Minimum 
(%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       50.02       11.98  0.00      52.76         72.40  
 Domestic Equities       32.07       10.36  0.00      40.45         79.82  
 International Equities       17.95       7.02  0.00      20.71         40.83  
 Bonds       33.06       9.98  0.00      30.60         100.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       32.50       5.31  0.00      30.05         100.00  
 International Bonds       0.56       1.07  0.00      0.24         4.00  
 Real Estate       8.45       6.03  0.00      6.29         33.56  
 Cash       6.02       2.21  0.00      6.84         14.77  
 Alternative Invest.       2.45       10.04  0.00      1.66         12.14  
 Pension Asset Beta       54.33       14.82 0.00      48.83        66.71 
 
 
     Panel D: Pension asset allocation, period 4: 2009–2013 
 
 Mean (%)   
  St. deviation 
(%) 
 Minimum 
(%)  Median (%)  Maximum (%) 
 Equities       59.64       13.88  0.00      58.76         76.50  
 Domestic Equities       36.02       13.52  0.00      38.99         73.79 
 International Equities       23.62       8.93  0.00      23.01         42.87  
 Bonds       24.41       9.25  0.00      21.75         100.00  
 US Govern. Bonds       22.98       10.69           0.00        18.33         100.00  
 International Bonds       2.53       2.63  0.00      0.49         11.02  
 Real Estate       6.92       4.85  0.00      6.54         29.50  
 Cash       2.01       3.91  0.00      0.17         22.50  
 Alternative Invest.       6.35       6.40  0.00      6.12         59.84  
 Pension Asset Beta       68.81       15.39 0.00       49.02         74.09 
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Table 4. Top-fifteen pension funds by liabilities and funding coverage ratio 
This table provides detailed characteristics for the top fifteen pension funds based on their liabilities (Panel A) 
and the fifteen best-funded pension plans (Panel B) as of 2013. In addition, it provides the 5- and the 10-year in-
vestment return, the percentage of assets allocated to equities and bond securities, and the systematic risk for 
each pension plan (i.e. portfolio beta). The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
Panel A: Top-fifteen pension funds by liabilities 
Pension fund Liabilities (U.S. $) 
Funding 
coverage 
ratio (%) 
Inv. 5 
year re-
turn (%)  
Inv. 10 
year re-
turn (%) 
% of in-
vestment 
in equities 
% of in-
vestment in 
bonds 
Portfolio 
beta 
California Teachers 222,280,992 67.0 3.72 7.53 53.6 16.79 0.57 
Florida RS 154,125,952 85.4 5.04 7.44 59.09 22 0.62 
Texas Teachers 150,666,000 80.8 5.4 7.2 49.7 14.3 0.64 
New York State Teachers 94,538,800 87.5 5.2 7.5 58.89 18.99 0.52 
Ohio Teachers 94,366,696 66.3 4.87 8.08 52.78 20.19 0.61 
Illinois Teachers 93,886,992 40.5 4.2 7.2 43.9 24.79 0.60 
Pennsylvania School Emp. 89,951,816 63.8 2.5 7.72 21.1 18.2 0.62 
Wisconsin Retirement Sys 85,328,704 99.9 1.7 4.8 36.28 14.83 0.58 
Virginia Retirement Sys 79,077,592 65.9 4 7.6 47.49 21.69 0.52 
Georgia Teachers 72,220,864 81.0 6.27 6.55 73.5 26.49 0.56 
Michigan Public Schools 63,839,728 59.5 6.8 7.4 41.79 12.1 0.62 
North Carolina Teachers 
and State Employees 63,630,280 94.1 5 6.6 46.4 33.79 0.63 
Oregon PERS 60,405,200 90.6 5 8.33 36.9 21.89 0.61 
University of California 57,380,960 75.9 4.67 6.62 47.99 23.99 0.57 
New Jersey Teachers 53,645,476 57.0 5.32 7.26 39.2 15.37 0.61 
 
Panel B: Top-fifteen pension funds by funding coverage ratio 
Pension fund Liabilities (U.S $) 
Funding 
coverage 
ratio (%) 
Inv. 5 year 
return (%) 
Inv. 10 
year re-
turn (%) 
% of in-
vestment in 
equities 
% of invest-
ment in 
bonds 
Portfolio 
beta 
Washington LEOFF Plan 2 6,859,000 114.6 3.81 8.29 37.7 22.62 0.63 
DC Police & Fire 3,644,085 110.09 7.19 6.8 52.99 28 0.65 
Washington Teachers Plan 8,016,000 104.9 3.81 8.29 37.7 22.62 0.66 
Washington PERS 2/3 23,798,000 102.3 3.81 8.29 37.709 22.62 0.60 
Washington School Em-
ployees Plan 2/3 3,273,000 101.9 3.81 8.29 37.7 22.62 0.62 
South Dakota PERS 8,803,700 100 7.11 8.72 50.7 19.7 0.64 
Wisconsin Retirement Sys 85,328,704 99.9 4.6 8.39 48.29 21.03 0.63 
North Carolina Local Gov 20,338,784 99.8 5 6.59 46.4 33.79 0.65 
TN Political Subdivisions 7,789,873 94.96 5.33 6.15 56.59 28.49 0.67 
North Carolina Teachers 
and State Employees 63,630,280 94.19 5 6.59 46.4 33.79 0.69 
TN State and Teachers 34,123,560 93.33 5.33 6.15 56.59 28.49 0.61 
Louisiana State Parochial  3,217,464 92.5 13.65 7.28 37.4 26.71 0.67 
Delaware State Employees 8,257,270 91.1 5.5 9.39 54.1 21.7 0.62 
Oregon PERS 60,405,200 90.69 5 8.33 36.9 21.89 0.68 
DC Teachers 1,759,043 90.09 7.2 6.8 52.99 28 0.67 
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Table 5. Relationship between lagged investment returns and Treasury yields on pension 
fund asset allocation 
This table presents the results of the regression of the change in the percentage of allocation to bond securities, 
short-term cash and equity assets on the mean investment return per period. It also provides the change in the port-
folio’s beta and Treasury yield based on the percentage of changes in the allocation of assets, for 151 US pension 
funds from 50 States resulting in 2,416 observations. Panel A exhibits results for well-funded pension plans. In 
contrast, Panel B presents results for the most underfunded pension plans, from 1998 to 2013. The major data 
source is the Public Plans Database obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the 
Bloomberg database. 
Panel A: Funding status decile 1 (best funding ratio) 
 
Percentage of assets invested in 
bond securities and cash 
 Percentage of assets invested in eq-
uities  
 
Investment 
return (%) 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield (%) 
Investment 
return (%) 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield (%) 
Period 1: 1998–2000 –2.06 0.42 3.67 4.81 0.68 2.89 
Period 2: 2001–2006 –3.03 0.57 6.81 6.94 1.73 7.22 
Period 3: 2007–2008 –5.91 0.85 7.36 –0.87 1.06 6.36 
Period 4: 2009–2013 –8.20 1.36 10.52 –2.39 0.41 7.61 
Probability > x2 0.48 – 0.52 0.59 – 0.53 
Pension funds 151 151 151 151 151 151 
R–squared: Period 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R–squared: Period 4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
	
	
	
Panel B: Funding status decile 2 (worst funding ratio) 
 
Percentage of assets invested in 
bond securities and cash 
 Percentage of assets invested in eq-
uities  
 
Investment 
return (%) 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield (%) 
Investment 
return (%) 
Portfolio 
beta 
Decline in 
treasury 
yield (%) 
Period 1: 1998–2000 –1.90 0.31 2.04 2.66 0.49 1.80 
Period 2: 2001–2006 –2.03 0.38 3.88 3.92 1.08 3.11 
Period 3: 2007–2008 –2.97 0.40 5.92 1.80 0.53 4.87 
Period 4: 2009–2013 –3.13 0.48 6.96 –0.94 0.21 5.05 
Probability > x2 0.49 – 0.51 0.53 – 0.51 
Pension funds 151 151 151 151 151 151 
R–squared: Period 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
R–squared: Period 3 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R–squared: Period 4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
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Table 6. Bayesian VAR counterfactual results  
This table reveals the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allocation decisions and risk-taking 
behavior. The time periods are split based on the drastic changes in monetary policy to capture the full effects and the 
changes in the characteristics of the pension funds. Three scenarios are simulated: i) 100 basis point increase in the 
Treasury yield; ii) 120 basis point increase in the Treasury yield; and iii) 200 basis point increase in the Treasury 
yield, for 151 US pension funds from 50 States, making 2,416 observations. The major data sources are the Public 
Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Overall sample period (1998–2013) 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean  3.62 1.44 6.56 0.55 
100bp 4.48 2.16 7.19 0.52 
120bp 4.97 2.28 7.25 0.51 
200bp 5.63 2.51 7.68 0.46 
    
 
Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean  5.03 3.01 7.86 0.49 
100bp 5.92 3.85 8.51 0.45 
120bp 6.06 3.97 8.64 0.44 
200bp 7.01 4.30 9.28 0.40 
    
 
Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean  3.84 1.97 7.12 0.52 
100bp 4.51 2.39 7.70 0.50 
120bp 4.64 2.45 7.83 0.49 
200bp 5.29 2.91 8.33 0.43 
    
 
Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean  2.97 1.29 5.87 0.57 
100bp 4.48 2.16 6.51 0.53 
120bp 4.97 2.28 6.70 0.52 
200bp 5.63 2.51 7.49 0.48 
    
 
Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean 1.96 1.01 5.10 0.61 
100bp 2.73 1.42 5.62 0.55 
120bp 2.88 1.59 5.75 0.54 
200bp 3.46 1.73 6.34 0.50 
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Table 7. Bayesian VAR estimation of portfolio effects with higher allocation of assets for 
bond securities  
This table presents the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allocation decisions and risk-taking 
behavior, based on the scenario that the allocation of assets in bond securities and short-term cash does not change 
from period 1 to period 4. The mean portfolio return represents 151 US pension funds from 50 States, making 2416 
observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement Re-
search at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
	
Overall sample period (1998–2013). 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean return 3.62 1.44 6.64 0.55 
100bp 4.48 2.16 7.48 0.51 
120bp 4.97 2.28 7.57 0.50 
200bp 5.63 2.51 7.86 0.45 
    
 
Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term Cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean return 5.03 3.01 7.86 0.49 
100bp 5.92 3.85 8.51 0.44 
120bp 6.06 3.97 8.64 0.43 
200bp 7.01 4.30 9.28 0.38 
    
 
Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean return 3.84 1.97 7.53 0.52 
100bp 4.51 2.39 7.91 0.50 
120bp 4.64 2.45 7.94 0.49 
200bp 5.29 2.91 8.52 0.42 
    
 
Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Mean return 2.97 1.29 5.91 0.57 
100bp 4.48 2.16 6.77 0.52 
120bp 4.97 2.28 6.82 0.51 
200bp 5.63 2.51 7.62 0.47 
    
 
Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) Systematic risk 
Actual return 1.96 1.01 5.28 0.61 
100bp 2.73 1.42 5.80 0.54 
120bp 2.88 1.59 5.91 0.53 
200bp 3.46 1.73 6.63 0.49 
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Table 8. Shocks, regimes and effects – MS-SVAR model 	
	 	 	 	 	
Regime/Shock 
Effect on G. 
B yields 
Effect on asset alloca-
tion for G.B 
Effect on allocation 
in equities/Alt. Inv. Effect on portfolio risk 
Peak level for I.R. Positive (>) Positive (>) Negative (<) Positive (lower risk) 
Decrease in I.R. Negative (<) Negative (<) Positive (>) Negative (higher risk) 
Moderate increase 
in I.R. 
Slightly posi-
tive (≥) Positive (>) Slightly negative (≤) Positive (lower risk) 
ZLB and QE Negative (<) Negative (<) Positive (>) Negative (higher risk) 
Note: G.B. denotes government bonds, Alt. Inv. denotes alternative investments, I.R. is the interest rate, ZLB is 
the Zero Lower Bound level for the interest rate, and QE denotes the launch of unconventional monetary policy 
with the Quantitative Easing program.  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
57	
	
Table 9. MS–SVAR counterfactual results 
 This table exhibits conditional forecasting for the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allo-
cation decisions and risk-taking behavior. The time periods are divided based on the drastic changes in mone-
tary policy to capture the full effects and the changes in the characteristics of pension funds. Three scenarios are 
simulated: i) 100 basis point increase in the Treasury yield; ii) 120 basis point increase in the Treasury yield; 
and iii) 200 basis point increase in the Treasury yield, for 151 US pension funds from 50 States, making 2416 
observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for Retirement 
Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database.	
	
Overall sample period. 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 3.62 1.44 6.56 
100bp 4.51 2.19 7.23 
120bp 4.98 2.28 7.29 
200bp 5.72 2.59 7.74 
    Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 5.03 3.01 7.86 
100bp 5.98 3.87 8.54 
120bp 6.11 3.99 8.67 
200bp 7.16 4.38 9.35 
    Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 3.84 1.97 7.12 
100bp 4.63 2.48 7.89 
120bp 4.69 2.51 7.92 
200bp 5.40 3.01 8.55 
    Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 2.97 1.29 5.87 
100bp 4.53 2.18 6.54 
120bp 4.98 2.28 6.72 
200bp 5.72 2.59 7.60 
    Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Actual return 1.96 1.01 5.10 
100bp 2.79 1.44 5.68 
120bp 2.90 1.61 5.77 
200bp 3.55 1.76 6.48 
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Table 10. MS-SVAR estimation of portfolio effects with higher allocation of assets for 
bond securities 
This table presents the effects of monetary policy shocks on pension fund asset allocation decisions and risk-
taking behavior based on the scenario that the allocation of assets in bond securities and short-term cash does not 
change from period 1 to period 4. The mean portfolio return represents 151 US pension funds from 50 States, 
making 2,416 observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Overall sample period. 
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 3.62 1.44 6.70 
100bp 4.51 2.19 7.53 
120bp 4.98 2.28 7.59 
200bp 5.72 2.59 7.92 
    Period 1: 1998–2000 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 5.03 3.01 7.86 
100bp 5.98 3.87 8.54 
120bp 6.11 3.99 8.67 
200bp 7.16 4.38 9.35 
    Period 2: 2001–2005 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 3.84 1.97 7.58 
100bp 4.63 2.48 7.94 
120bp 4.69 2.51 7.97 
200bp 5.40 3.01 8.61 
    Period 3: 2006–2007 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Mean return 2.97 1.29 5.95 
100bp 4.53 2.18 6.79 
120bp 4.98 2.28 6.83 
200bp 5.72 2.59 7.84 
    Period 4: 2008–2013 
  
Estimate Bond securities (%) Short-term cash (%) Portfolio total return (%) 
Actual return 1.96 1.01 5.33 
100bp 2.79 1.44 5.84 
120bp 2.90 1.61 5.92 
200bp 3.55 1.76 6.68 
59	
	
Table 11. Marginal log-likelihood for 5.000 simulations 
This table displays results for bridge sampling and Chib’s method for the marginal likelihood value for bridge 
sampling and Chib’s method. The shortest distance from zero indicates the most appropriate the number of re-
gimes. The most suitable number of regimes appears in bold. The sample period is from 1998 to 2013 and con-
tains a total of 2416 observations. The major data sources are the Public Plans Database, obtained from the Cen-
ter for Retirement Research at Boston College and the Bloomberg database. 
 
Filtered probability of regimes 1 2 3 4 5 
Overall sample      
Bridge sampling –853.82 –844.76 –833.09 –822.23 –829.70 
Chib –849.21 –841.04 –831.71 –820.85 –830.63 
Period 1      
Bridge sampling –938.03 –930.60 –920.33 –909.75 –921.44 
Chib –936.42 –931.93 –921.15 –910.06 –919.10 
Period 2      
Bridge sampling –855.73 –849.01 –840.19 –829.37 –840.62 
Chib –842.88 –834.26 –824.25 –813.65 –824.77 
Period 3      
Bridge sampling –972.11 –963.08 –953.02 –941.24 –951.94 
Chib –956.07 –947.63 –937.19 –926.16 –935.29 
Period 4      
Bridge sampling –968.79 –960.48 –950.42 –939.92 –948.67 
Chib –951.40 –943.85 –934.16 –923.10 –931.80 
 
 
 
 
 
